Winslow Papers

The New Province: Spem Reduxit

In Ann Gorman Condon, The Envy of the American States: The Loyalist Dream for New Brunswick (Fredericton: New Ireland Press, 1984), pp. 131-151.

Stripped to its essence, the political philosophy of the Loyalists who were appointed to organize and govern the new British province of New Brunswick centered around a profound belief in the positive aspects of power. Like virtually all the Loyalist participants in the American Revolution, these men were convinced that Great Britain had lost her thirteen colonies through a failure to govern. During their 150-year development. Britain had failed to establish in the colonies strong institutions and powerful, independent executives which could serve as bulwarks of the standing order and could contain the inevitable pressures for popular control within acceptable political limits. During the critical decades of the 1760s and 1770s, moreover, Britain had compounded this error by failing to assert her supreme authority unequivocally when it was challenged by the more extreme colonial leaders. Instead, both before and during the war, British policy was marred by a passive, vacillating spirit which enabled the colonial radicals to seize the initiative and persuade their more moderate country men to support the independence movement. The Loyalists were convinced that had Great Britain used her enormous economic, political, and military resources in a more timely, more certain, and more direct manner, the historic break need not have occurred.

For the great majority of New Brunswick leaders, this belief in strong, active government was most particularly an outgrowth of their experiences during the revolutionary war itself. For most of these men, the war had been the great formative experience in their lives. Their first chance to assume important public responsibility came usually after the fighting had begun and the debate had ended. Many were commissioned officers during the war, while several others served in a military support capacity. Thus, their first personal exposure to the actual dynamics of power occurred under conditions of warfare, when qualities of leadership, decisiveness, and tenacity were at a premium - rather than under the more typical conditions of American political life when persuasiveness, an ability to give and take, and a sensitivity to underlying currents of opinion were usually required for success. This wartime experience profoundly impressed the future Loyalist leaders of New Brunswick and affected their attitude toward public affairs in three ways in particular. First, they developed a firm belief in the ability of the individual man, especially the man in command, to shape the course of events. They agreed, for example, with the common Loyalist criticism that the British generals sent to America were incompetent, and that different men could have wrought a different result. Second, they proved peculiarly susceptible to the traditional military emphasis on loyalty to one's own group and particularly to one's fellow officers. As the scions of the old Tory elite, these young men had been exposed since birth to aristocratic feelings of superiority and exclusivity, and their wartime experiences simply enhanced these feelings. Third, the war reinforced their basic Tory disposition to believe in the efficacy of action, in the need to use governmental power positively to achieve desired ends. The war, in their view, had been lost by default, by a failure to act, and particularly by a failure to take advantage of the Loyalists' familiarity with American conditions.

The plans and proposals which the Loyalists drew up after the war for the government of British North America reflected these basic attitudes. Although these proposals covered an exceedingly wide range of topics, they all stressed the need to appoint men of proven merit and loyalty to the chief posts in the colonies and then to give them both the authority and the means to act in the best interests of their colony and empire. The colonial governor, the council, the judiciary, the heads of the local churches and schools must all be made so secure in their tenure, so independent in their livelihood, and so powerful in their individual capacities that they could perform their public duties without yielding for the passions of the crowd or to the exigencies of the frontier. Their authority would, of course, be carefully circumscribed in the historic English constitutional manner, and the rights of individuals to personal privacy and public participation was to be respected at all times. But within these limits, the loyalist plans for British North America urged that the local colonial executive must be given sufficient ability and support to act in an immediate, decisive manner.

The politics of the Partition Movement seemed to vindicate the Loyalists' faith in the effectiveness of strong, united leadership. For these military-minded men, the establishment of the province of New Brunswick represented a great personal victory. And, although later historians might disagree, the Loyalist officers and agents were convinced that partition had been achieved as a direct result of their unremitting efforts to promote the cause of a separate Loyalist province, of their close political coordination on both sides of the Atlantic, and of their stubborn refusal to be discouraged by the cries of discontent within their own ranks or by the machinations of the Nova Scotia government.1 Against considerable odds, they had remained true to their belief in themselves as political leaders and for their ideals of colonial government. The result was the creation by Great Britain of a separate political province which the Loyalist leaders would he permitted to dominate and mold according to their best political lights. Their fondest dreams had been realized through their direct, united action. The designation by Great Britain of the motto "Spem Reduxit" for the new province symbolized its emotional significance to these Loyalists.2

The actual men appointed to the key positions in the new province only served to increase the Loyalists' sense of triumph and exultation. Colonel Thomas Carleton, brother to the great Sir Guy and himself an experienced military man, was to come out as governor.3 Ten of the twelve seats on the council were reserved for Loyalists of impeccable credentials. Six of these went to men from Massachusetts who had all distinguished themselves in defense of the King's authority in America: Edward Winslow, Daniel Bliss, James Putnam, Joshua Upham, and those two venerable patriarchs of' the Loyalist cause, Jonathan Sewell and Abijah Willard. The other four Loyalist seats on the Council went to men from the middle colonies, who lead served as close advisers to Sir Guy Carleton: George D. Ludlow and his brother Gabriel C. Ludlow of New York, Isaac Allen and Jonathan Odell of New Jersey. With the possible exception of Daniel Bliss, all of these councillors had actively supported the Partition Movement. The two non-Loyalist appointments to the Council Board simply confirmed their dominance. For these posts went to William Hazen and Major Guilford Studholme, the two key representatives of the old inhabitants who had allied themselves with the Loyalist officers and agents to support the establishment of a separate province in their region. As for the law offices, the enormous wealth of legal talent within the Loyalist ranks resulted in a clean sweep of all these provincial appointments. George Ludlow was named Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and James Putnam, Isaac Allen, and Joshua Upham were to serve as assistant judges. Jonathan Bliss was named attorney general of the province (after Sampson Salter Blowers had declined the post) and Ward Chipman the solicitor general. To cap their victory, Governor Carleton chose that quintessence of Loyalist elitism, Jonathan Odell, to fill the highly influential post of provincial secretary. In sum, then, every important appointive post within New Brunswick was given either to a member of the Loyalist leadership group or to a proven ally, and this practice would be extended to the lower political levels once the actual administration of government was set in motion.

The only disappointments were personal. Those hardy veterans of the campaign on the St. John River -Edward Winslow, George Leonard, John Coffin, and Amos Botsford - were passed by in the distribution of salaried, remunerative posts. In part, these omissions were due to the exit of General Henry Fox - the one British official personally familiar with the abilities and contributions of these men. In part, the very intensity of their efforts - particularly the threats of violence during the height of the Finucane affair damaged their reputations in the eyes of the highly skittish British colonial officials. But Winslow put his finger on the main cause of the slight when he noted, with unfeigned bitterness, that a "pack of heavy ass'd pensioners" had been preferred to the men on the spot.4 All the salaried posts in New Brunswick were given to Loyalists resident in London for the simple, crass reason that Great Britain could thereby strike their names from the pension rolls. Winslow, it is true, was given a seat on the Council and an unsalaried judicial post, but he would have to wait twenty long years before achieving the substantial policymaking position which his extraordinary efforts on behalf of the new province surely merited, and which his personal finances so desperately needed. Leonard was luckier. Through his friendship with Sir Guy Carleton, he managed in 1787 to become Superintendent of Trade and Fisheries at Canso - or chief enforcer of the Navigation Acts against illicit American traders and fishermen - a job perfectly suited to his personal predilections. As for Botsford and Coffin, they would have to wend their way through the thicket of elective politics in order to gain a voice in provincial affairs.

Despite these individual disappointments, the personnel of New Brunswick's first governing class inspired the Loyalist leaders with a fresh, exhilarating sense of hope and purpose. Without reservation, the Crown appointments met the Loyalists' standards of merit and integrity. Winslow, the most romantic of the lot, was simply transported by the caliber of the new provincial leaders and predicted the most extravagant success:

The Eyes of the World seem to be fixed on that country. The exalted reputation of the Governor - the abilities and integrity of the public officers have produced a universal confidence and mankind appear to expect (what perhaps it is impossible to perform) a detection of frauds - encouragement of industry and virtue - and an impartial distribution of justice . The task will he arduous, but 'tis possible to effect all this in my opinion, by the united exertions of the officers of Government.5

Even the dour Chipman permitted himself to hope that "we shall have as good a society and live as happily and chearfully [sic] in the province of New Brunswick as in any part of the King's Dominions."6

Whether romantic or dour by nature, the Loyalist leaders were unquestionably revitalized by the unique character of the New Brunswick government. Here was a province led by men of their own stamp, possessing similar tastes and ideals, where they could reclaim their public dignity and private fortunes through service to their community and their empire. Assured of the benevolent protection of Great Britain, and of the guidance of this experienced cadre of leaders, it seemed realistic to hope that they could erect in New Brunswick a harmonious, respectable society, which they would live in with pride and which might in time become "the envy of the American states."

Interestingly enough, the New Brunswickers' spirits were not noticeably dampened by the fact that none of the basic structural reforms which they had urged upon Great Britain after the war was included in their provincial constitution. The extensive suggestions made by the Loyalists for colonial reorganization in the early 1780s were simple ignored by Great Britain, and New Brunswick was given a charter fundamentally similar to the one held by Nova Scotia and by most of the other royal colonies before the American Revolution.7 The power of the governor was not increased, nor was he given any greater scope for local initiative. The councillors and the judges were still to serve during pleasure, and no titles or special emoluments were granted to enhance their prestige. Originally only the very top officials - the governor, the chief justice, the surveyor general, the attorney general, the provincial secretary, and the customs officials - were given an independent income by the Crown; all the others were to look to their fees and to the provincial assembly for support. No initial allowance was made for the establishment of local churches and schools, although salaries were provided for four ministers of the Church of England. In fact, the only substantial innovation in Carleton's original instructions was the explicit disavowal by Great Britain of the right to tax the colonists - in accordance with the concession held out to the American colonies by Parliament in 1778.8

Although these New Brunswick Loyalists had vigorously supported the various proposals for colonial reform, apparently none of them protested when their province was given such an old-style colonial charter. It is interesting to speculate why. Perhaps three years of political in-fighting had simply worn down their resistance. Or, to grant them the courage of their convictions, perhaps they lived in hope that when Great Britain completed her plans for the promised reorganization of British North America - when a Governor General was appointed and the individual colonies were integrated into a more rational, imperial scheme - their proposed reforms would then be implemented. The fact that both Governor Carleton and key provincial leaders continued to agitate for a wholly independent judiciary, for royal support of local churches and schools, and for a resident bishop after they arrived in New Brunswick, demonstrates the continued importance they placed on the need for reform. Yet neither the governor nor his Loyalist advisers seemed seriously dissatisfied with the constitution of their new province, or feared that it would hamper their effectiveness. For, at heart, they all tended to place their faith much more in men than in measures. The fact that virtually all of New Brunswick's ranking provincial officials were veteran American loyalists, with such extensive experience in the problems of colonial management, seemed a better promise for the future than the most sweeping reform measure. Buoyed up by this confidence in their own capabilities, and enamoured of the reputation of their new governor, the Loyalist leaders set off for New Brunswick to begin the task of governing.

The excitement of this new political challenge was intensified by the return of a certain measure of economic security to the lives of the Loyalist leaders. The blight which the revolution had cast on their personal fortunes seemed finally to be lifting. Most of the leading New Brunswickers were awarded military half-pay for life, an indescribably valuable income base for men entering a wilderness situation. Moreover, the long-promised Claims Commission had finally begun to hold its hearings, and nearly 500 New Brunswickers (including practically all the main leaders) applied for capital reimbursements which would enable them to undertake substantial economic enterprises in their new home. As the leading members of the new province, moreover, these Loyalist officials could look forward to a choice of the best available lands, and to whatever fees and salaries their individual posts entailed. Finally, the glorious news that Great Britain had remained true to the sacred principles of the Navigation System, and closed the West Indies to American shipping, seemed practically to guarantee the commercial prosperity of the province. For it gave the British North American colonies a monopoly of the carrying trade to those Caribbean islands, as well as a substantial inducement to develop the natural resources of their region in order to supply the West Indian markets directly. Thus the Loyalist leaders began their task of governing New Brunswick within a context of bright economic prospects and sublime political confidence.

The Structure of Government

From the moment of their arrival in the province, Carleton and his Loyalist advisers proceeded to discharge their responsibilities with a remarkable amount of skill and clarity of purpose. Over the incredibly short space of eleven months, they managed to settle the people on their lands, to organize the province into political units, to set the wheels of government in motion, and literally, to produce order out of chaos. Their actions were in fact so quick, so decisive, and so unified that one is practically forced to conclude that most of the basic decisions regarding the administration of the province were hammered out during the long voyage from London to New Brunswick. Be that as it may, the significant fact is that Carleton and his Loyalist appointees irrevocably laid down the basic structure of New Brunswick's government in the year 1784-1785 and then, when all was in readiness, called a provincial election so that the Assembly could ratify their decisions.

It was clearly the governor himself who set this fast pace, although the advice and experience of his Loyalist councillors were everywhere evident. Carleton took pains to explain the philosophy underlying his actions to Lord Sydney, the British secretary of state. He had, he assured Sydney, no intention of governing without an Assembly, but he was particularly anxious that "the spirit of American innovation should not be nursed among the Loyal refugees." Accordingly, he and his Council had endeavoured to introduce "the practice of the best regulated Colonies" into New Brunswick and by "strengthening the executive powers of Government [to] discountenance it's leaning too much on the popular part of the Constitution." The governor pointedly acknowledged that he was "anxious to finish every thing respecting the organization of the Province that properly belonged to the Prerogative before a meeting of Representatives chosen by the people, convinced that they will be most usefully employed in adapting the Laws to a Government already formed." This unequivocal assertion by Carleton that the role of the executive branch of government was to initiate basic political decisions, and the role of the popular branch was simply to ratify measures presented for it by the executive, was in complete accord with the convictions of the Loyalist leaders regarding the proper operation of a colonial government. It is not surprising, therefore, that the governor was able to assure Sydney that "These several steps have been taken with the unanimous advice of the Council."9

The "several Steps" covered a wide variety of decisions. Before examining them, it is worth noting that some of the more fanciful Loyalist suggestions had either to be rejected or postponed for the moment. Many of these were put forward by Edward Winslow. When he first learned of the British government's approval of the new province, Winslow sent an ebullient letter to Chipman with precise instructions regarding the accoutrements which the new governor should have in order to command the necessary respect. "When he comes he must bring out materials for building - such as locks, hinges, &c. &c. - furniture. He shall have an elegant house -a Church a State house - an assembly room - & a playhouse if he pleases ... He's probably come out in a Frigate - he ought to stipulate for a ship & part of the troops to be stationed there. He knows how important it is to have pleasant commanding officers - therefore he'l endeavour to point out such as will please him."10 Carleton did indeed arrange for two British regiments to be stationed in New Brunswick - an item of intense importance to him as a military man - and no doubt he made sure that the commanding officers were "pleasant." He also built a handsome governor's mansion but the State House, the Assembly room, and the playhouse were only realized after many years and bitter wrangles. Winslow's further suggestion that a regiment or more of New Brunswick Loyalists should be embodied to strengthen the defences of the province (and restore needy officers like himself to full pay), was simply ignored by the economy-minded British paymasters.11 And his offer to establish in New Brunswick the elaborate record-keeping system which he had devised for Massachusetts before the Revolution was deemed too complicated for such an infant colony.12 The same fate met William Paine's suggestion that "judicious Reservations" of land should be made for the Crown throughout the province. They would strengthen "the Interest of Government," noted Paine, "and in process of time an Estate would he created for the Crown, which may ultimately become as necessary as estates were for the Kings previous for the abollition [sic] of the feudal Tenures."13 Probably all of these suggestions were received warmly by Governor Carleton and his Council, but the press of so much urgent business prevented their adoption.

The four major problems which engrossed the attention of the governor and his Loyalist advisers during the first critical year were: (1) the location of the provincial capital, (2) the settlement of the people on their lands, (3) the political organization of the province, and (4) the beginnings of government operations. The decisions which they made in these four areas left an indelible mark on the character of the province and strikingly revealed their own personal hopes regarding the precise nature of its development.

Provincial Capital

The first and most far-reaching decision made by the new administration was to locate the provincial capital seventy miles upriver in the midst of the agriculturally rich St. John River Valley. The town was named Fredericton, and its particular choice was based on four carefully considered factors. First, Carleton and his official circle wished to place primary economic emphasis in their province upon agricultural rather than commercial development. As Carleton explained to his brother, Lord Dorchester, by encouraging the cultivation of the interior, the province would in a short time be able to feed and clothe itself and supply provisions to other colonies, without interfering with the commerce of the "Parent State." Trade should be encouraged, he felt, "only so far as its exports shall require," so that the inhabitants of the province would not be tempted to commence an illicit contraband trade, with all the damaging social consequences that such activity inevitably provoked.14 Second, the provincial officials hoped to encourage wide-spread settlement throughout the province by locating the capital near its geographical center.15 Third - and this factor was probably preeminent in Carleton's thinking - an up-river location offered distinct military advantages. The two regiments of British troops could be safely garrisoned there, immune from a sudden coastal attack, and they would be equidistant from both Halifax and Quebec in case of need. The Fredericton site, moreover, was located at the beginning of the lands reserved for the Loyalist provincial regiments. Both Edward Winslow and Lord Sydney pointed out the advantages of remaining in close contact with these veterans, so that they could be reactivated quickly if necessary.16

The fourth and final reason for the choice of an inland, agricultural center as the seat of government was based on a pronounced aversion, which Governor Carleton shared with most of the Loyalist leaders, to the hurly-burly life and commercial orientation of cities. Both their rural background and their military experience inclined the majority of the provincial leaders to look with dismay at the disorder, the congestion, and the instability of city life. The fact that the overwhelming majority of Loyalist leaders chose to live on farms indicates that they preferred a placid, routinized environment for themselves and believed that a rural atmosphere - remote from the crowds, the flux, the tempo of the city - would be conducive to peaceful, orderly government. This ingrained bias against urban life was reaffirmed by the early settlement experience in the Saint John harbour area, when tumults and disorders kept the settlers in a constant state of anxiety - partly due to land disputes, but also due to the highly transient character of the population. Well aware of the inflammatory potential of cities, the governor and the Loyalist leaders much preferred to develop their province along more serene agricultural lines.

Land Settlement

The most urgent and complex problem facing the new government was, of course, the need to get the people quickly settled on their own lands. Here the government officials combined legal ingenuity with long, strenuous council sessions devoted to defining and approving each individual grant. With consummate skill, the government managed to bypass the intricate escheat process and vacate many of the old, aggravating Nova Scotia land grants quickly by issuing an order-in-council that all existing grants in the new province must be registered within three months or become forfeit.17 At the same time, escheat proceedings were taken against other large, uncultivated grants. Thanks to these two devices, a vast amount of land in New Brunswick was opened up and, as Carleton happily reported to his brother, "the great obstacle to the settlement of the province ... at length removed."18 Although normally a reticent man, Carleton went out of his way to praise the efforts of his councillors in accomplishing this enormous task.19

For themselves, most of the Loyalist officials chose land near the capital, both for reasons of convenience and speculation. The two Crown lawyers, Ward Chipman and Jonathan Bliss, preferred to remain in the City of Saint John, for reasons of private practice, as did the two principal merchants on the Council, Gabriel Ludlow and William Hazen. As for the population in general, they were given their personal choice of lands wherever possible, which tended to produce a highly dispersed pattern of settlement. Except for the commercial aggregations along the coast at the ports of Saint John, Saint Stephen, and Saint Andrews, New Brunswick's Loyalist population quickly became scattered along the many navigable rivers and fertile valleys in the province, where they lived on small, isolated farms, bereft of any local supporting institutions or any sense of community spirit.

Provincial Organization

The third major decision taken by the government officials during their first year of operation was to impose a specific political structure upon the province. Their determination to avoid the example of New England and Nova Scotia, and to follow the practice of the old American royal colonies was particularly evident in this set of decisions. As Carleton explained to Sydney, most of the Loyalist soldiers and refugees "have emigrated from N York and the Provinces to the Southward, [and] it was thought prudent to take an early advantage of their better Habits ." Accordingly, the province was divided into eight counties and the parish, rather than the town, was made the basic unit of government. Even Maugerville - the one substantial, well integrated community in existence before the Loyalist influx - was purposely divided into two separate parishes, obviously in hopes of breaking down the old New England custom with their repugnant emphasis on popular participation.20

Paradoxically, the government at the same time decided to incorporate the City of Saint John and to give it a charter containing a large measure of local self-government. The charter itself was a replica of the one held by New York City before the Revolution. And inasmuch as Carleton himself had had no previous experience in American colonial administration, it seems certain that this charter was adopted upon the recommendation of his Loyalist advisers. It is regrettable that the arguments used by the Loyalists in favor of the charter have been lost to time, for they must have presented an exceedingly rosy picture of colonial New York City.21 Certainly Carleton became completely convinced that this instrument would strengthen "the internal police" of the seaport area, and permit much needed commercial regulations to be enacted. The Charter provided that the mayor, the sheriff, the recorder, and the city clerk were to be appointed by the governor, while the "Aldermen, Assistants, and Constables are to be annually chosen in their respective wards." Obviously Carleton felt that his control over the four executive posts in the city would give the governor a decisive voice in its affairs, for he informed Sydney that "although every useful liberty is given to the Citizens there is a sufficient influence retained in the hands of Government for the preservation of Order and securing a perfect obedience."22 Lord Sydney, however, was not so sanguine. Although he agreed to let the charter stand, the secretary of state severely censured Carleton for enacting such a measure without prior approval from home, and expressed grave misgivings about its wisdom.23 In that event, Sydney would prove to be right. The provision for annual local elections in Saint John virtually condemned that city to a non-stop round of electioneering and political disputation - to the utter discomfiture of the governor and the Loyalist leaders. None of these officials, however, perceived the highly democratic elements in the charter at the time it was granted. On the contrary, Carleton assured Sydney that "it was the most efficacious measure that could be adopted to reclaim the multitude and to promote the habits of order and Industry."24

Beginnings of Government Administration

In setting the actual process of government in motion, Carleton and his advisers made many additional decisions and appointments. All of these were consistent with their primary goal of establishing in New Brunswick a stable, agricultural society under the benevolent guidance of strong reputable leaders. In fact one of Carleton's very first acts as governor was to write home urging that the salaries of all the assistant judges of the Supreme Court should be paid by the Crown. It simply was not possible, he explained, that "any Salaries can yet he contributed for their support by the people here, who are struggling with many difficulties and hardships in the settlement of an uncultivated Country..." At the same time, the governor emphasized (in words which epitomized the views of the loyalist leaders) that "the influence of respectable men in the several offices of Government is ... of more than common importance."25 As Carleton and his advisers proceeded to fill up the many lesser posts under the government's jurisdiction, similar concern was devoted to the qualifications of each candidate. Almost all of the posts were given, not surprisingly, to Loyalists with well established credentials. The governor's nominations for the City of Saint John were a case in point: Gabriel Ludlow was named as mayor, William Sanford Oliver as sheriff, Ward Chipman as recorder, and Bartholomew Crannel as clerk - all men of vintage Loyalist stock. Likewise, the county justices of the peace, sheriffs, clerks, and surrogates were, whenever possible, drawn from the ranks of reliable Loyalists and appointed before the first election was called, so that the executive branch of government would be at full strength when the popular branch began its operations.

The courts of justice were also set in motion and the table of legal fees established during this first, formative year. Less than four months after the arrival of Carleton's official party, Benjamin Marston reported that "The Supreme Court sat last week and have condemned three poor Devils to the Gallows - some others to a temporary imprisonment & others to the Whipping Post - so the work of Reformation is begun among us."26 Here again, Carleton and his Council pointedly avoided the customs of New England and established their court system in conformance with the example of colonial New York. From Halifax, Sampson Salter Blowers complimented the New Brunswickers on their choice: "I like much the method you adopted in the conduct of criminal business. It is the proper one, but we proceed in the old New England practice. Your bar will mend," he predicted, "and ... you will have it in your power to model it almost as you like."27

Carleton and his Council also began the important task of conciliating the old French- and English-speaking inhabitants of the province soon after their arrival. Both of these peoples naturally felt a great deal of hostility towards the Loyalist hordes who had disrupted their settlements and often times forced them to abandon their homes. The new government moved quickly to win the allegiance of these people by offering to compensate them for any losses caused by the Loyalist influx and to give them new land grants under the same favorable conditions accorded to the Loyalists. These delicate negotiations would take several years to complete, but the Carleton government was unequivocal in its determination to do justice to these old Acadian and New England inhabitants, and the policy of rapprochement was set in motion during the first year of administration.28

There were many other instances in which Carleton and his advisers manifested a genuine, humanitarian concern for the welfare of the people of New Brunswick. The best illustration was their decision to extend the royal allowance of food and provisions for an additional year, contrary to the explicit instructions of the British government. Although this action was highly unpopular with the Treasury Board, Carleton staunchly insisted that considerations of mercy absolutely obliged him "to relieve a number of these unfortunate people from starving ..." He expressed great confidence that the fertility of the soil in New Brunswick would soon enable the people to produce ample food for themselves, "but it must he remembered," he noted in September 1785, "that many of the settlers have got upon their lands this very summer and few have been set down more than 18 months."29

Juxtaposed to this benevolence toward their own people was the anxiety of the government leaders to cut off all commercial intercourse with the United States and rigidly to enforce the Navigation System. Before his first year was out, Carleton issued a proclamation prohibiting the import from the United States of anything but food and livestock, and it was clear that the government would enact a total ban on American imports as soon as it was physically possible.30 This precipitate move caused Gregory Townsend, a hearty British soldier who had known the Loyalist since the days in New York, to tease his New Brunswick friends about the high cost of their principles: "Exclusive of a stronger reason, your not having Victuals or drink, it must afford more Satisfaction to a rigidly virtuous Loyal Mind to Pine in the Slender Allowance of Government rather than to grow fat on the Delicacies from our Rebellious neighbors ..."31

*     *     *

In the process of making these first critical decisions, there was an intriguing coordination of effort between the governor and his Loyalist advisers. Carleton was the pacesetter - who admittedly drove his Council to the point of fatigue in his determination to establish the framework of government before the first Assembly met. His Loyalist advisers complemented the governor's sense or urgency with their own desire to take full advantage of their role as the founders of New Brunswick in order to direct the development of the province in accordance with their political ideas. Although Carleton pushed them hard, he gave his loyalist advisers the intensely gratifying experience of making all the substantive decisions in the critical area of internal policy. For Carleton's genuine sympathy for the Loyalists was matched by his total indifference to civilian political matters. As a person, he was a narrow-minded, rigidly punctilious product of the British military system - whose interests never ranged far beyond the perquisites of his command and the observance of military protocol. He accepted the governorship of New Brunswick only because he was out of political favor in England. He performed his duties assiduously there because he hoped that a political success would return him to favor and result in an attractive military post.32 Accordingly, he accepted the judgment of his Loyalist advisers upon the details of all major decisions - both because he expected to leave the province soon and because he was completely unversed and uninterested in colonial polities. For the Loyalist leaders, Carleton's attitude presented an ideal opportunity - a supportive governor who consistently accepted their political recommendations and put them into operation with unheard-of dispatch. By means of this unusual combination of talents, the province of New Brunswick was quickly organized into a stable, rural society, governed by an able, tightly knit oligarchy of Loyalist gentry - who were determined to retain the initiative in public affairs and to confine the general population to a passive, ratifying role.

The First Election

Eleven months after his arrival in New Brunswick, when all was in a state of readiness, Governor Carleton issued the writs for the first provincial election. The ensuing contests amply justified the government's careful preparations. In many respects, the election represented the final outburst of the anarchic situation which had preceded the establishment of the province, rather than a protest against the new government. The issues were numerous. In the outlying counties, the contests centered mainly, as might be expected in a new settlement, around the geographical origins of the various candidates. North Britons, true Loyalists, New Englanders, and old inhabitants vied with each other in accurate reflection of the jockeying among these groups for the best lands and posts in their districts. In Maugerville, the old inhabitants lost out by dividing their strength among four candidates rather than concentrating on two.33 But in most areas the prize went to the man most familiar on the local scene, often to the disgust of the recently arrived Loyalist officers who considered themselves better qualified. Benjamin Marston's notes on the election in Northumberland County offer a good Loyalist version of the contests in the more remote areas of the province:

Today held an Election for two members to represent this County in Gen. Assembly. William Davidson an inhabitant of this River an ignorant - cunning fellow - but who has great influence over the People here many of them holding lands under him - & many others being Tradesmen & labourers in his employ - was chosen for one - & by the same influence a Mr. Elias Hardy an attorney of no great reputation in his profession - an Inhabitant of the City of St. John was chosen for the other. This will disappoint some of my Friends - who hoped that Geo Leonard Esq. & Capn Stanton Hazzard would have obtained the election - But 'twas impossible. They were unknown here & who proposed & recommended them were but strangers - tis therefore no wonder we did not succeed against an artful man who had a real influence & knew how to use it.34

Marston at least conceded the fairness of the election result in his district. In Charlotte County, however, the Loyalist Gillam Butler indignantly insisted that all those friends "who wish that American influence should prevail in the government" ought to rally behind his cause and contest the illegality of the election in his district. Butler pointedly noted that "I own the most valuable landed property in this County ... [and] I have kept from forty to Sixty People constantly employed..." And he vowed, with all the condescending arrogance that flowed so easily from the lips of the Loyalist gentry, that "if I have not justice done me ... and there is to be such a partial distribution of Honours, & favours; upon some who are destitute of principle, & property; upon others, whom, within my remembrance were pedlars of small wares ... that my aversion to being governed by Scotchmen is so great that I will quit the Country."35 These Loyalist defeats in Northumberland and Charlotte counties were, however, the exceptions to the rule. In most of the other, outlying counties, the large resident Loyalist population faithfully - and quietly - chose men from their own ranks to represent them. The result was that the returns from the outlying counties alone filled the Assembly with a clearcut majority of pro-government, pro-Loyalist members."36

The fiercest and most interesting contest took place in the City of Saint John, where six of the twenty-six Assembly seats were to be decided on, and where an official slate of pro-government candidates, including the Attorney General Jonathan Bliss and the Solicitor General Ward Chipman, was offered to the voters. The naming of this slate provoked a counter list of six candidates, led by Tertullus Dickinson, the brother-in-law of Elias Hardy.37 Although Hardy himself declined to run in Saint John, it was assumed by everyone, including Governor Carleton, that this "London lawyer" was the mastermind behind the opposition group.38 There were, in addition, several individual candidates who offered, but all interest focused on the two sets of six, known respectively as the "Upper Covers" (pro-government) and the "Lower Cowers" (anti-government). The result was that in Saint John the election was much more specifically concerned with the policies of the new government than in the outlying counties. It is true that many of the issues which had agitated the Loyalists since their exodus from New York - particularly the petition of 55, the allotment of lands and provisions during the initial settlement period, and the Partition Movement - were resurrected and debated for one final time. But most interest focused on allegations that the government was behaving in a high-handed manner by attempting to put its placement in the Assembly and through other "gross insults and impositions."39

The election debate in Saint John was carried on principally by means of letters and advertisements in the two local newspapers. Although only a few of these early issues are still available, it is clear that the candidates from the Lower Cove identified the new provincial government with the old "55" and with the former agents and directors of the settlements. They claimed that the new provincial officials were pursuing the same policy of favoritism towards a select few - particularly New Englanders - at the expense of the many. "Damn the Irish Governor and his Yankee Council" was said to be a favorite toast at the taverns of the Lower Cove,40 and the public was urged to give their votes to "'men of plain sense, chosen from the middling class." The supporters of the government slate were equally vociferous in defense of their candidates. The right of the attorney general and solicitor general to sit in the Assembly was declared to be "a hallowed British tradition," and the accusations against the "55" and the Loyalist agents were dismissed as being both untrue and irrelevant to their new provincial situation. The "Upper Covers" cautioned the electorate to be on their guard against:

designing persons who may mislead them, and under the mask of candor answer their own artful purpose. Suppose, Sir, that while we are exerting ourselves in this country to keep the Attorney General and Solicitor General out of the Assembly, some one gentleman of the same learned profession ... make a property of our middling members, and use them as instruments of faction & ... But one word more ... We have been one year under the direction of this Governor and Council, and the inhabitants at large seem not only to be satisfied, but I have not heard of an individual who has a grievance to complain of, and does not meet with instant attention and immediate relief.41

The candidates of the Upper and Lower Coves were distinguished by their background and their economic circumstances, as well as by their attitude to the new government. The Upper Cove slate were all conspicuous American Loyalists, whereas Dickinson's group were predominantly British in background. "Where, and at what time, came the telling question, "did these gentlemen hazzard their lives, and property, in support of the King's government?"42 The pro-government slate was, moreover, composed exclusively of men of property: Chipman and Bliss were lawyers, and the other four were all merchants. By contrast, it was alleged that five out of six of the Dickinson group "were bred to and have always been employed in humble, tho' useful occupations."43

The social structure of Saint John was still so fluid in 1785 that it is impossible even to guess at the motivation of the electorate. Probably the decisive factor in the election was the fact that, because so many bona fide residents were still not on their lands, the government was forced to permit all male inhabitants over twenty-one years of age resident in the province for three months to vote. This lack of property qualification clearly tipped the scales in favor of the more popular Lower Covers, and they were on their way for an easy victory when a tavern fight between some Upper and Lower Covers turned into all exceedingly bloody riot. Sheriff William Sanford Oliver - New England Loyalist and Carleton appointee - abruptly closed the poll, arrested several of the rioters, and called in the troops to restore order. The poll was reopened six days later under extremely strict regulations. After the voting was completed, a scrutiny was taken, in which 160 Lower Cove votes were disallowed by Sheriff Oliver, and the Upper Cove, pro-government slate were, as a result, declared the victors.44 According to Ward Chipman, this reversal of the original election result was solely due to "the Stupidity of the Lower Cove Candidates in not attending the scrutiny & defending their votes."45 The Lower Covers, however, were unwilling to accept such a simple explanation. In a "vehement petition" addressed to Governor Carleton, supporters of the six Lower Cove candidates claimed that they had been chosen by a "decided majority" and then deprived of their seats in a most unconstitutional manner. The petitioners described themselves as "most faithful and loyal Subjects" who had "joyfully emigrated to an Uninhabited Corner; in order to preserve that warm Attachment for Our most Glorious Constitution and the best of Kings." They then proceeded to give their version of the election contest:

For we have Seen British Subjects confined in Irons Carried into a Garrison ... One of our legal Representatives confined in a Sentry Box ... The Military introduced ... and unlawfully patrolling the streets during an Election to the terror and Alarm of tile peaceable inoffensive inhabitants ... Crown Officers ... refusing to discharge their duty. The Freedom of Election Violated by corrupt and undue Influence, in the most public Manner. The returning Officer behaving with the most unprecedented and unconstitutional conduct ... We most positively affirm these Proceedings to Be unjust ... and ... producing an extraordinary Situation: Viz. the Representatives of the People in Opposition to the People.46

Governor Carleton chose to ignore this petition and accept the election of the Upper Cove slate as valid. In a letter to Lord Sydney, Carleton recounted the events in Saint John and vigorously defended the "decisive measures" taken to restore public peace: "Considering the motley description of persons collected here ... and the disorderly conduct many of them have been habituated to during a long Civil war, it seems of the last consequence to hold the Reins of Government with a strait hand, and to punish the Refractory with firmness. Hitherto all has been mildness on the part of their Rulers; indeed their distresses and their wants peculiarly required it. Perhaps the lessons now taught the lawless will prevent future repetitions of severity."47 Both Lord Sydney and the House of Assembly agreed. Sydney fully endorsed Carleton's conduct and went on to urge that a property qualification be imposed in future elections.48 The House Of Assembly rejected the Lower Cove's petition for a new election and then, by a substantial majority, passed a stiff bill regulating "tumults and disorders."49 The government's victory, in short, was complete and completely satisfying. But the belief that the election had been won illegally lingered on in Saint John, and left a legacy of deep-seated hostility toward Carleton and his Loyalist advisers.

The First Assembly

From the government's point of view, the first House of Assembly fulfilled perfectly its assigned role as a ratifying body. In his opening message, Carleton urged the legislators to show their gratitude for Great Britain by "discouraging all party distinctions amongst us, and inculcating the utmost harmony..." Then, using the precise phrases which the Loyalist leaders had devised to express their dreams for New Brunswick, the governor affirmed his own personal belief in the potential of the province: "it is with real pleasure that I declare, that our prospects are so favourable that your exertions for those beneficial purposes can scarcely fail to render this Asylum of loyalty, the envy of the neighboring states and that by exerting the arts of peace, they who have taken refuge here will not only be abundantly recompensed for their losses, but be enabled to enjoy their connection with the parent state and retain their allegiance for the best of kings, which their conduct has proved they prize above all considerations..."50

Inspired by Carleton's ringing call to duty, the Assembly proceeded to implement his recommendations with dispatch and amiability. Amos Botsford, one of the original Loyalist agents and a close government supporter, was elected speaker. The House then proceeded to accept the political and judicial organization of the province laid down by the Governor and Council, to endorse their policy of land settlement, to establish the Church of England in the province, and to pass a revenue bill. There was no real controversy during this first session, and Carleton's pleasure with their accomplishments was unqualified. With considerable pride, he informed his longtime friend, Lord Shelburne, that after two arduous years the King's authority is tolerably well established in this Country, the Government possesses the confidence of the public, and that the inhabitants are enabled to avail themselves of their own industry."51

In 1788, the settlement phase of New Brunswick history drew to a close with the transfer of the provincial capital from Saint John to its permanent home in Fredericton. In the four short years of its life the new government had seen the arrival of peace and prosperity. Perhaps not all of the Loyalist leaders would have agreed with Edward Winslow's declaration "That allmighty God permitted a rebellion in America to punish it's inhabitants for their supineness in not discovering q country the best calculated of any in the continent to ensure health, & produce the comforts of life."52 Yet the provincial leaders were unquestionably and legitimately pleased with the fruits of their labors. The people were settled quietly on their land and numerous saw-mills had sprung up along the many rivers, so that the province was increasingly able to supply its basic needs. The growth and wealth of the City of Saint John was particularly encouraging. Bishop Charles Inglis was astonished to count "upwards of 1000 houses in the city in 1788," even though "scarcely five years have elapsed since the spot on which it stands was a forest."53 The monopoly of the carrying trade to the West Indies had provided the basis for a burgeoning ship-building industry within the province and a market for its natural resources. Ward Chipman noted in 1789 that most of the "monied men" were investing in mercantile ventures, and in 1790 the merchant Munson Jarvis proudly reported to his brother William that "our exports of fish Lumber & Vessels is very Considerable each of which employs a very Great number of People..."54 It is true that some Loyalists had left the province, but Jarvis dismissed these people as "idle vagrants" who were more than compensated for by the distinguished Loyalists who continued to arrive from England.55

Not only was New Brunswick prospering, but the Loyalists' constant reference point, the United States, seemed to be floundering. By means of a constant exchange of letters and visits, the Loyalists were kept personally informed of the progress of the new republic and what they heard seemed to confirm the wisdom of their choice. A Connecticut colleague of Ward Chipman's was so despondent over the commercial future of America in 1785 that he implored Chipman to send him specific advice regarding the possibility of his removing for New Brunswick: "No description I can give you of the miserable state of business in New England, could convey to your mind a just picture of that low Ebb to which it is reduced - I need not tell you to what fatal Event this is to be attributed, but shall only observe, that the Inhabitants themselves all confess it was not so before the war."56 Three New Brunswickers who visited the United States in the 1780s sent back equally gloomy reports. When Dr. William Paine returned to Massachusetts, in a desperate effort to collect some pre-revolutionary debts, he found conditions so chaotic that it was impossible to transact business. "Peace has only fluttered, over this Land, and has not yet, been able to find a permanent resting Place."57 The merchant George Deblois sent an even more invidious report on conditions in America: "The Mobility are endeavoring to eradicate all British Factors out of this place & have even forbid the Inhabitants purchasing any thing from them ... has not this a little of the appearance of our former Non Importation times? I think that we in the new settlements breathe a much greater share of Free Air, than those renown Sons of Freedom - for my own part I do not Envy them."58 But Benjamin Marston, who had suffered as much as any Loyalist from the reverses of the war, was moved close to pity by the confused state of America:

This place [New York] is visibly on the decline... The much greater part of their Foreign Trade is carryed on by Foreigners ... But 'tis observed Let the Spaniards or who else Bring ever so much money among them - The British Ships and be d--d to them carry it all away again ... The Politicks in this Country are all turn'd to one Grand Object - The establishment of some Form of Government wch will support it self with energy & Effect - Respecting wch all Eyes are impatiently waiting the determination of the Convention. That ... may he ultimately produce something like a King Lords & Commons ... I find John Adams the Congress's Ambassador to G Britain is loosing [sic] all his Popularity. The Newspaper Scribblers put him & our late Governour Hutchinson in the same predicament ... they now say he has wrote an encomium on the British Constitution ... I forgot in the state of Trade of this City to inform you That there is not one single Ship on Stocks in the Whole Town - Poor Devils - Tho they richly merit every evil they yet feel & will feel - for they have many more to come yet - I cant help commiserating them a little.59

These eye-witness reports from America were supplemented by extensive newspaper coverage of the strife-torn republic. The two provincial newspapers practically vied with each ether to see who could produce the worst news about America. The three items of greatest interest were the continuing persecutions of the Loyalists in the United States, Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts, and the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. More often than not, reports of these proceedings were accompanied by predictions of imminent financial collapse, or enforced dictatorship, or anarchy. The Royal Gazette reliably reported on November 13, 1787, that the advocates of the new constitution intended "to cram that Constitution down the throats of the people," and the only persons supporting ratification were the "ignorant herd." Yet The Saint John Gazette carried a report from New York on October 26, 1787, that if this dictatorial constitution were not approved "Shays and like tyrants will take over the Country." This journal also kept alive the old Loyalist prediction that the European powers would soon combine to dismantle the young republic. On December 7, 1787 an unidentified Cassandra from Boston was quoted as saying "'Great Britain will never forget her lost power in America - she may dissemble for a time . but the moment she could make a new effort with better hope than at present, she would certainly do it ... the soil of America may perhaps be crimsoned again.'"60

As the New Brunswickers contemplated the imminent disintegration of the United States, the quality of life in their province improved almost daily. Men with capital, like Ward Chipman and Benedict Arnold, built elegant houses in Saint John and decorated them with English wallpaper and mahagony furniture. Elaborate balls and suppers were laid on by the Governor and others during the meetings of the House of Assembly to relieve the tedium of politics. The arrival of the Claims Commissioners in late 1780 not only gave a spring to the economic hopes of the inhabitants, but provided a welcome occasion for social festivity and display. By 1789, theatre groups were visiting the province and the Loyalists' hopes of establishing a cultivated, prosperous society in the wilderness seemed close to realization.61


1. MacNutt asserts that the sheer size of the Loyalists' settlements on the north side of the Bay of Fundy made partition "inevitable" (New Brunswick, p. 42). A numerous group of Canadian historians, led by the imperial scholar, Chester B, Martin, have detected a more Machiavellian purpose at work here. In their view, the establishment of New Brunswick was part of a carefully conceived British policy to "divide and rule" its remaining territory in North America, a policy allegedly suggested to the government by William Knox (Chester B. Martin, Empire and Commonwealth, Studies in Governance and Self-Government in Canada, Oxford: 1928, pp. 89-92; and Marion Gilroy. "The Partition of Nova Scotia," pp. 375-91). However, no evidence of a "divide et impera" policy can he found in Knox's published papers or in the colonial record series for the period. Indeed it is difficult to conceive how Great Britain could have adopted and implemented such a clearcut, tough-minded policy in 1784, given the extremely weak state of her internal politics. Back

2. The official description of the Great Seals for New Brunswick was: "On one side, a Ship Sailing up a River, on the borders of which is a New Settlement, with lofty Pines on each side, destined to Naval Purposes, with this Motto Spem Reduxit, and this Inscription round the circumference - Sigill Provincia Novi Bruns: On the reverse side were the royal arms and titles." P.C. 2/129, 10 September 1784, p. 412. Back

3. "Statement of Services by Thomas Carleton," 8 February 1810, Thomas Carleton Papers (PAC); William O Raymond, Life of Thomas Carleton," New Brunswick Historical Society, Collections, 2 (1899), 439-81. Back

4. Winslow to Coffin, 4 October 1784, Winslow Papers. Back

5. Winslow to Chipman, 2 March 1785, ibid. Back

6. Chipman to Jonathan Sewell, sr., 9 July 1784, Sewell Correspondence. Back

7. The Privy Council order creating New Brunswick specified that the government of the new province was to be "as analogous to that of Nova Scotia as circumstances will permit." P.C. 2/129, 18 June 1784, p. 193. Back

8. Royal Commission and Instructions to Thomas Carleton, C.O. 188/1; Sydney to Carleton, 20 August 1784, C.O. 188/3. Carleton's commission and instructions are printed in the New Brunswick Historical Society, Collections, 2 (1899), 394-430. Back

9. Carleton to Sydney, 25 June 1785, C.O. 188/3. Back

10. Winslow to Chipman, 26 April 1784, Lawrence Collection. Back

11. Winslow to Chipman, 31 March 1785, ibid. Back

12. Winslow to Chipman, 25 April 1785, Winslow Papers. Back

13. William Paine to Sir John Wentworth, 23 February 1786, Wentworth Papers, Akins Collection. Back

14. Carleton to Dorchester, 22 March 1787, Thomas Carleton Letterbooks (PANB), No. 7. Back

15. Carleton to Sydney, 25 April 1785, C.O. 188/3. Back

16. Winslow to Chipman, 25 April 1784, Lawrence Collection; Royal Instructions to Thomas Carleton, C.O. 188/1. Back

17. Order by Governor Carleton, 25 November 1784, New Brunswick Executive Council Papers (PAC), XVI, Crown Land Office Regulations. Back

18. Carleton to Dorchester, 22 March 1787, Carleton Letterbooks, No. 7; Floyd B. MacMillan, "Trade of New Brunswick with Great Britain, the United States and the Caribbean, 1784-1818" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, UNB, 1954), p. 24. Back

19. Carleton to Sydney, 28 September 1785, C.O. 188/3; Robert Fellows, "The Loyalists and Land Settlement in New Brunswick, 1783-1790: A Study in Colonial Administration," The Canadian Archivist, 2 (1971), No. 2, pp. 5-6. Back

20. Carleton to Sydney, 25 April 1785, C.O. 188/3; MacNutt, New Brunswick, p. 91. Back

21. Second perhaps only to Boston, New York in the late colonial period was a center of riots and revolutionary sentiment. See Edward Countryman, A People in Revolution: the American Revolution and Political Society in New York, 1760-1790 (Baltimore, 1982), pp. 36-47. Back

22. Carleton to Sydney, 25 June 1785, CO. 188/3. The charter is printed in Eric L. Teed, Canada's First City, Saint John (Saint John, 1962), pp. 3-45. Back

23. Sydney to Carleton, 5 October 1785, C.O. 188/3. Back

24. Carleton to Sydney, 14 May 1786, ibid. Back

25. Carleton to Sydney, 25 November 1784, ibid. Back

26. Benjamin Marston to Winslow, 11 February 1785, Winslow Papers. Back

27. Sampson Salter Blowers to Chipman, 9 March 1785, Lawrence Collection. Back

28. Minutes of the Executive Council, New Brunswick (PANB), 22 December 1786; Carleton to Chipman, 8 March 1785, Thomas Carleton Papers (NBM); Fellows, "Loyalists and Land Settlement," p 6. Back

29. Carleton to Major General Campbell, 28 September 1785, C.O. 188/3; Carleton to Evan Nepean, 29 September 1785, ibid; Sydney to Carleton, 20 September 1787, ibid. Back

30. Carleton to Sydney, 20 October 1785, ibid. Back

31. Gregory Townsend to Chipman, 12 December 1784, Lawrence Collection. Back

32. Carleton to Lord Shelburne, 6 June 1786, Thomas Carleton Papers (PAC). Back

33. John Hazen to William Hazen, 11 November 1785, quoted in William O, Raymond, ed., "The James White Papers, 1781-1788," New Brunswick Historical Society, Collections, 2 (1899), 57-58. Back

34. Diary of Benjamin Marston, Entry for 17 November 1785, Winslow Papers, XXII. Back

35. Gillam Butler to Ward Chipman, 26 November 1785, Lawrence Collection. Back

36. Jonathan Sewell, jr., to Jonathan Sewell, sr., 5 December 1785. Sewell Correspondence. Back

37. Royal Gazette, 18 October 1785. A detailed study of this election, told from the point of view of the opposition slate is David G. Bell, Early Loyalist Saint John: The Origins of New Brunswick Politics, 1783-1786 (Fredericton, 1983). Bell vividly documents the bitterness of the Lower Covers and their resentment over government use of force to suppress their protests. His contention that the strife in Saint John was a continuation of prerevolutionary tension credits the opposition groups with more organizational structure and more political coherence then I have been able to find. Back

38. Carleton to Sydney, 20 November 1785, C.O. 188/3. Back

39. "Advertisement of John Smith Hetfield," Royal Gazette, 1 November 1785. Back

40. Patrick Clinch to John Saunders, 4 September 1835, Winslow Papers. Back

41. Unsigned letter to "Mr. Printer," Royal Gazette, 22 November 1785. Back

42. Letter to Mr. Sower from "C.C.," Royal Gazette, 27 December 1785. Back

43. "To the Inhabitants of New Brunswick" by "A Native American Loyalist," ibid., 3 January 1786. Back

44. "Instructions of Governor in Council to Sheriff of Saint John for the more orderly conducting of the present Election..." Lawrence Collection, VII; Notes of Ward Chipman on "The King vs. John Jenkins, et al. for riot and assault," 3 May 1786, ibid., XXI. Back

45. Chipman to Winslow, 4 January 1786, Winslow Papers. Back

46. Petition to Gov. Thomas Carleton from the Electors of the City of Saint John, n.d. [c. March 1786], Thomas Carleton Papers (PAC). Back

47. Carleton to Sydney, 20 November 1785, C.O. 188/3. Back

48. Sydney to Carleton, 19 April 1786, C.O. 189/1. Back

49. New Brunswick Legislative Assembly, Journal of the Votes and Proceedings of the House of Assembly, 1786-1814 (Fredericton, 1893), I, 21-22, 58. Back

50. Ibid., 5-7 (9 January 1786). Back

51. Carleton to Shelburne, 6 June 1786, Thomas Carleton Papers (PAC). Back

52. Winslow to Sir John Wentworth, 15 February 1786, Wentworth Papers, Akins Collection. Back

53. Journal entry, 1 August 1788, Bishop Inglis Papers, l787-1842 (UNB transcripts), vol VIII. Back

54. Ward Chipman to Messrs. Henry Appleton and Frederick Pigon, jr., 7 November 1789, Chipman Papers. Back

55. Munson Jarvis to William Jarvis, 7 July 1790, Jarvis Papers. Back

56. John Moore to Ward Chipman, 29 January 1785 and 17 May 1785, Lawrence Collection. Back

57. Paine to Wentworth, 1 March 1788, Wentworth Family Papers. Back

58. George Deblois to [Chipman], 1785, Lawrence Collection, XX. Back

59. Benjamin Marston to Winslow, 10 August 1787, Winslow Papers. Back

60. Notable examples are the issues of The Royal Gazette for 15 August 1786, 24 October 1786, 9 October 1787, 13 November 1787, and 11 December 1787; and the issues in The Saint John Gazette for 26 February 1784, 15 July 1784, 15 June 1785, 26 October 1787, and 9 November 1787. Back

61. Mary Elizabeth Smith, Too Soon the Curtain Fell: A History of Theatre in Saint John, 1789-1900 (Fredericton, 1981), pp. 1-7. Back