

possible, that is, all ought to be as nearly as possible under the same laws, and to look up to one common source, that they may have a common interest to pursue, and a common power to obey: therefore the more you vary your laws from this principle, and the more new authorities you create, the more you distract and weaken your government, because the more interests you create, and interest will be in all situations invariably pursued. This reasoning is the foundation of the maxim *Imperium in Imperio existere non potest*. All corporations and all charters are diminutions of and injuries to your government. All such distinct bodies will prefer their own to the common interest, and were they not under the controul of the judicial authority of the state, whose proximity and vigour may check any ill consequences, we should often experience material injury from them in England. Remote from this check and half the time impetrable to us, from the foregoing principles we may learn that you are creating a new power in Canada that will cause you much trouble and vexation, and will accelerate their separation intirely from England. The members of this assembly we may suppose, will have the same passions, and feelings as other men, that is, they will suffer nobody to direct, and govern them, when they think they can do it full as well themselves. Being constituted a house of commons, they will assume the supposed powers, and privileges of such a house,

To Lord Sidney.

5-2

My Lord.

Canada being in your Lordship's department, and the confidence with which it is reported that S^t Guy Cartleton is appointed to the government of it, with larger powers than ever former Governor possessed, is the reason of this Address to your Lordship -- his professional reputation, his great integrity, and his confessed abilities, certainly merit any delegation of power with which a subject may safely be entrusted, and the voice of all parties will unite in the wisdom of conferring the government of the province upon the preserver of it -- the following observations upon a new, and as far as it respects Canada, unusual mode of governing that province by Assembly, which is said to be in contemplation, are submitted to the patriotism, candour, and good sense of your Lordship -- we need not recur to ancient examples to prove the difficulty of managing popular Assemblies. we have had more than a century's experience of our own -- the history of our late Colonies is scarce any thing but a detail of the contests of those Assemblies with the representatives of the Crown -- it was the power and influence of those Assemblies that finally, perhaps for this nation fortunately, severed them from us, and completed their Independence. . . . permit me just to sketch to your Lordship the real powers, and the probable consequential ones that such Assembly will assume. . . . being the representatives of the whole Colony, and best acquainted with the abilities and wants of their constituents, their duty will consist in passing such laws as the exigency of their wants may demand. This in one word will be their legal power. Let us for a moment suppose what will be the probable consequences of such power. The ambitious, turbulent, and factious among them, such spirits exist in all